Truthful germs are contagious: a local-to-global characterization of truthfulness

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2014.01.004zbMath1296.91097OpenAlexW2057857467MaRDI QIDQ2016243

Aaron Archer, Robert D. Kleinberg

Publication date: 19 June 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.01.004

zbMATH Keywords

orthogonal polynomialsfirst-order logicincentive compatibilityweak monotonicityimplementation theorycyclic monotonicityStokes's theoremmulti-dimensional typeslocal-to-global characterizationRochet's theoremSaks-Yu theoremtruthful mechanism designtruthful stitchingvortex-freeness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (19)

Monotonicity and revenue equivalence domains by monotonic transformations in differences ⋮ Strategyproof facility location in perturbation stable instances ⋮ Characterizing implementable allocation rules in multi-dimensional environments ⋮ Characterization of Truthful Mechanisms for One-Dimensional Single Facility Location Game with Payments ⋮ Implementability under monotonic transformations in differences ⋮ Multidimensional mechanism design in single peaked type spaces ⋮ The polyhedral geometry of truthful auctions ⋮ Roberts' theorem with neutrality: a social welfare ordering approach ⋮ A lower bound of \(1+\varphi \) for truthful scheduling mechanisms ⋮ Selling mechanisms for a financially constrained buyer ⋮ Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains ⋮ Dominant strategy implementation with a convex product space of valuations ⋮ Local incentive compatibility with transfers ⋮ Efficient implementation with interdependent valuations and maxmin agents ⋮ Multi-unit auctions: beyond Roberts ⋮ Truthful Mechanisms with Implicit Payment Computation ⋮ Implementability with contingent contracts ⋮ TESTING THE QUANTAL RESPONSE HYPOTHESIS ⋮ Dominant strategy implementability and zero length cycles

Cites Work

• A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
• Multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design
• Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
• Weak monotonicity and Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility
• Monotonicity and Implementability
• Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation
• Optimal Auction Design
• Incentives in Teams
• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
• An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
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