Auctions for social lending: a theoretical analysis
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Publication:2016244
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.05.004zbMath1296.91124OpenAlexW2156951735MaRDI QIDQ2016244
Ning Chen, Nicolas S. Lambert, Arpita Ghosh
Publication date: 19 June 2014
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.05.004
Cites Work
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