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DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2012.11.002zbMath1296.91140OpenAlexW3123636336MaRDI QIDQ2016245

Victor Naroditskiy, Geoffroy de Clippel, Nicholas R. Jennings, Maria Polukarov, Amy Greenwald

Publication date: 19 June 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/345503/1/main.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

budget balanceredistribution mechanismsinefficient allocation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (10)

A subsidized Vickrey auction for cost sharing ⋮ Optimal private good allocation: the case for a balanced budget ⋮ Withholding and damage in Bayesian trade mechanisms ⋮ Optimal budget-balanced ranking mechanisms to assign identical objects ⋮ A Solomonic solution to the problem of assigning a private indivisible good ⋮ Constrained-optimal strategy-proof assignment: beyond the Groves mechanisms ⋮ Maximizing social welfare in congestion games via redistribution ⋮ Optimal allocation of an indivisible good ⋮ Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms ⋮ Destroy to save

Cites Work

• Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions
• Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions
• Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms
• Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects
• Fair imposition
• Destroy to save
• Redistribution Mechanisms for Assignment of Heterogeneous Objects
• Algorithmic Game Theory
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