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Publication:2016245
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2012.11.002zbMath1296.91140OpenAlexW3123636336MaRDI QIDQ2016245
Victor Naroditskiy, Geoffroy de Clippel, Nicholas R. Jennings, Maria Polukarov, Amy Greenwald
Publication date: 19 June 2014
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/345503/1/main.pdf
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Related Items (10)
A subsidized Vickrey auction for cost sharing ⋮ Optimal private good allocation: the case for a balanced budget ⋮ Withholding and damage in Bayesian trade mechanisms ⋮ Optimal budget-balanced ranking mechanisms to assign identical objects ⋮ A Solomonic solution to the problem of assigning a private indivisible good ⋮ Constrained-optimal strategy-proof assignment: beyond the Groves mechanisms ⋮ Maximizing social welfare in congestion games via redistribution ⋮ Optimal allocation of an indivisible good ⋮ Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms ⋮ Destroy to save
Cites Work
- Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions
- Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions
- Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms
- Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects
- Fair imposition
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- Redistribution Mechanisms for Assignment of Heterogeneous Objects
- Algorithmic Game Theory
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