Strategy-proof contract auctions and the role of ties

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.09.001zbMath1296.91141OpenAlexW2058110299MaRDI QIDQ2016246

Paul Harrenstein, Vincent Conitzer, Mathijs de Weerdt

Publication date: 19 June 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.09.001

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnesssocial choice functionindifferencestie-breakingcontract auctionweakly transferable utility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching
• The core of the matching game
• Stable marriage and indifference
• Topics in mathematical economics and game theory. Essays in honor of Robert J. Aumann
• Core-selecting package auctions
• Towards a Mechanism for Incentivating Privacy
• Models for Iterative Multiattribute Procurement Auctions
• Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
• Algorithmics of Matching Under Preferences