Fault tolerance in large games

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.06.007zbMath1294.91020OpenAlexW2087005894MaRDI QIDQ2016249

Omer Reingold, Ronen Gradwohl

Publication date: 19 June 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.06.007

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumfault tolerancelarge games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games with infinitely many players (91A07)

Related Items (10)

Large strategic dynamic interactions ⋮ Recent studies of agent incentives in Internet resource allocation and pricing ⋮ Hotelling games in fault-prone settings ⋮ Multi-round cooperative search games with multiple players ⋮ PPAD-complete approximate pure Nash equilibria in Lipschitz games ⋮ PPAD-complete pure approximate Nash equilibria in Lipschitz games ⋮ Recent studies of agent incentives in internet resource allocation and pricing ⋮ Partial exposure in large games ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Incentive-based fault tolerant control of evolutionary matrix games

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