Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2012.09.002zbMath1296.91130OpenAlexW1990326103MaRDI QIDQ2016253

Carmine Ventre, Paolo Penna

Publication date: 19 June 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.09.002

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryalgorithmic mechanism designtransferable utilities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Heterogeneous facility location without money, Mechanisms with Monitoring for Truthful RAM Allocation, Approximation guarantee of OSP mechanisms: the case of machine scheduling and facility location, The anarchy of scheduling without money, Combinatorial auctions without money, Average-case approximation ratio of scheduling without payments, Combinatorial auctions with verification are tractable, A new lower bound for deterministic truthful scheduling, Bribeproof Mechanisms for Two-Values Domains, The Anarchy of Scheduling Without Money, Automated optimal OSP mechanisms for set systems. The case of small domains

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