Existence and stability of weakly Pareto-Nash equilibrium for generalized multiobjective multi-leader-follower games
DOI10.1007/s10898-014-0178-yzbMath1315.91011OpenAlexW2007941711MaRDI QIDQ2018476
Jihao He, Yanlong Yang, Wensheng Jia, Shu-wen Xiang
Publication date: 24 March 2015
Published in: Journal of Global Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10898-014-0178-y
generic stabilityessential solution\(C\)-quasiconcave-likegeneralized multiobjective multi-leader-follower gamesweakly Pareto-Nash equilibrium
Noncooperative games (91A10) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Set-valued maps in general topology (54C60) Games involving topology, set theory, or logic (91A44) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)
Related Items (14)
Cites Work
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