Nash equilibria for the multi-agent project scheduling problem with controllable processing times

DOI10.1007/s10951-014-0393-xzbMath1310.90051OpenAlexW2010950708MaRDI QIDQ2018940

Cyril Briand, Jean-Charles Billaut, Alessandro Agnetis, Přemysl Šucha

Publication date: 26 March 2015

Published in: Journal of Scheduling (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10951-014-0393-x

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriaflow networksmulti-agent project scheduling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic network models in operations research (90B15) Stochastic scheduling theory in operations research (90B36) Performance evaluation, queueing, and scheduling in the context of computer systems (68M20) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (5)

Finding an optimal Nash equilibrium to the multi-agent project scheduling problem ⋮ How to apply penalties to avoid delays in projects ⋮ Nash equilibrium solutions in multi-agent project scheduling with milestones ⋮ Preface: Project management and scheduling ⋮ Price of anarchy and price of stability in multi-agent project scheduling

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