Characterization of the Pareto social choice correspondence

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.05.003zbMath1461.91124arXiv1804.04047OpenAlexW3035703578MaRDI QIDQ2019331

Jerry S. Kelly

Publication date: 26 April 2021

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1804.04047

zbMATH Keywords

Paretomonotonicitystabilitybalancednesstops-in

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (2)

Collective choice rules with social maximality ⋮ Revealed desirability: a novel instrument for social welfare

Cites Work

• A foundation for Pareto optimality
• Balancedness of social choice correspondences
• A stability property in social choice theory
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