Cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation in \(k\)-approval voting

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.07.001zbMath1461.91118OpenAlexW3040969926MaRDI QIDQ2019338

Francesca Rossi, Edith Elkind, Umberto Grandi, Arkadii M. Slinko

Publication date: 26 April 2021

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.07.001

zbMATH Keywords

computational complexitybounded rationalitystrategic voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Voting theory (91B12) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Is it ever safe to vote strategically?
• Generalized solution concepts in games with possibly unaware players
• Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
• Strong and coalition-proof political equilibria under plurality and runoff rule
• The complexity of facets (and some facets of complexity)
• Single transferable vote resists strategic voting
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?
• Iterative voting and acyclic games
• Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games are the generalized Condorcet winners
• The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
• Extensive games with possibly unaware players
• Weak undominance in scoring rule elections
• Gibbard-Satterthwaite games for \(k\)-approval voting rules
• On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules
• Scoring rule voting games and dominance solvability
• Sequential voting with abstention
• Plurality Voting with Truth-Biased Agents
• Convergence of Iterative Scoring Rules
• Complexity of Safe Strategic Voting
• Beyond Plurality: Truth-Bias in Binary Scoring Rules
• Equilibria of Plurality Voting: Lazy and Truth-Biased Voters
• The Boolean Hierarchy I: Structural Properties
• The Boolean Hierarchy II: Applications
• Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
• Threats, Counter-Threats, and Strategic Voting
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games
• On the Theory of Strategic Voting1

This page was built for publication: Cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation in \(k\)-approval voting