Labor market matching with ensuing competitive externalities in large economies

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.05.004zbMath1461.91193OpenAlexW3122421981MaRDI QIDQ2019341

Bo Chen

Publication date: 26 April 2021

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.05.004

zbMATH Keywords

fixed pointefficiencymatchingspilloveraggregate externalities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68) Labor markets (91B39)

Related Items

Downstream competition and upstream labor market matching

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Matching with aggregate externalities
• Stability of marriage with externalities
• KKM principle, fixed points, and Nash equilibria
• The nonatomic assignment model
• Two-sided matching problems with externalities
• Downstream competition and upstream labor market matching
• Many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms
• A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms
• The assignment game. I: The core
• Stable one-to-one matchings with externalities
• Stable Matching in Large Economies
• Competing Teams