Superset-robust collective choice rules

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.10.007zbMath1461.91088OpenAlexW3105359897WikidataQ115163017 ScholiaQ115163017MaRDI QIDQ2019358

Susumu Cato, Walter Bossert

Publication date: 26 April 2021

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.10.007

zbMATH Keywords

filteragreementcollective choice ruleinfinite populationsuperset robustness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (3)

Stable preference aggregation with infinite population ⋮ Independent, neutral, and monotonic collective choice: the role of Suzumura consistency ⋮ Preference aggregation and atoms in measures

Cites Work

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• Social choice correspondences with infinitely many agents: serial dictatorship
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
• A Note on the Complete Independence of the Conditions for Simple Majority Decision

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