Evolutionary implementation in aggregative games

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2020.11.004zbMath1459.91009OpenAlexW3104654251MaRDI QIDQ2019359

Ratul Lahkar, Saptarshi Mukherjee

Publication date: 26 April 2021

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://dp.ashoka.edu.in/ash/wpaper/paper38.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

aggregative gamesimplementationexternalitiespotential games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Evolutionary games (91A22) Potential and congestion games (91A14)

Related Items (6)

Generalized perturbed best response dynamics with a continuum of strategies ⋮ An evolutionary approach to pollution control in competitive markets ⋮ Evolutionary robustness of dominant strategy implementation ⋮ Survival of altruistic preferences in a large population public goods game ⋮ Statistical inference in evolutionary dynamics ⋮ The logit dynamic in supermodular games with a continuum of strategies: a deterministic approximation approach

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