Majority rule for profiles of arbitrary length, with an emphasis on the consistency axiom

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.12.001zbMath1459.91056OpenAlexW3111433097WikidataQ114013685 ScholiaQ114013685MaRDI QIDQ2019362

Beth Novick, Henry Martyn Mulder, Fred R. McMorris, Robert C. Powers

Publication date: 26 April 2021

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.12.001

zbMATH Keywords

consistencymajority rulepartial anonymitymajority with bias

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

Breaking ties in collective decision-making

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