Election control through social influence with unknown preferences

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-58150-3_32OpenAlexW3081663399MaRDI QIDQ2019485

Federico Corò, Mohammad Abouei Mehrizi, Emilio Cruciani, Gianlorenzo D'Angelo

Publication date: 21 April 2021

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1905.04694

zbMATH Keywords

computational social choicesocial influenceinfluence maximizationelection control

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Discrete mathematics in relation to computer science (68Rxx)

Related Items (3)

Optimal majority dynamics for the diffusion of an opinion when multiple alternatives are available ⋮ Election control through social influence with voters' uncertainty ⋮ Election Manipulation on Social Networks: Seeding, Edge Removal, Edge Addition

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