On the values of Bayesian cooperative games with sidepayments

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.09.002zbMath1461.91028OpenAlexW2733159438MaRDI QIDQ2021335

Andrés Salamanca

Publication date: 26 April 2021

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.09.002

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative gamesShapley valueincomplete informationtransferable utilityincentive compatibilityvirtual utility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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