Rank-dominant strategy and sincere voting

DOI10.1007/s11238-020-09771-3zbMath1461.91119OpenAlexW3006034708MaRDI QIDQ2021546

Yasunori Okumura

Publication date: 27 April 2021

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-020-09771-3

zbMATH Keywords

uncertaintyvotingmechanism designChoquet expected utilitysincere voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Related Items (1)

What proportion of sincere voters guarantees efficiency?

Cites Work

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