Rank-dominant strategy and sincere voting
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Publication:2021546
DOI10.1007/s11238-020-09771-3zbMath1461.91119OpenAlexW3006034708MaRDI QIDQ2021546
Publication date: 27 April 2021
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-020-09771-3
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