A strategic justification of the constrained equal awards rule through a procedurally fair multilateral bargaining game
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Publication:2021552
DOI10.1007/s11238-020-09782-0zbMath1461.91022OpenAlexW3109653600MaRDI QIDQ2021552
Makoto Hagiwara, Shunsuke Hanato
Publication date: 27 April 2021
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-020-09782-0
Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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Cites Work
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