An indirect evolutionary justification of risk neutral bidding in fair division games

DOI10.1007/S00182-020-00739-9zbMath1461.91150OpenAlexW2903752438MaRDI QIDQ2021786

Paul Pezanis-Christou, Güth, Werner

Publication date: 27 April 2021

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://media.adelaide.edu.au/economics/papers/doc/wp2018-09.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

fair divisionevolutionary stable strategiesrisk neutrality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Evolutionary games (91A22) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Related Items (1)

Continuous action iterated dilemma with data-driven compensation network and limited learning ability

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Ex-post regret heuristics under private values. I: Fixed and random matching
• Believing in correlated types in spite of independence: an indirect evolutionary analysis
• Amicable divorce: Dissolving a partnership with simple mechanisms
• Asymmetric price-benefits auctions
• A comparison of pricing rules for auctions and fair division games
• Auctions, public tenders, and fair division games: An axiomatic approach
• On the dynamic foundation of evolutionary stability in continuous models.
• Dissolving a partnership (un)fairly
• Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model

This page was built for publication: An indirect evolutionary justification of risk neutral bidding in fair division games