Receiver's sensitivity and strategic information transmission in multi-sender cheap talk

DOI10.1007/s00182-020-00747-9zbMath1461.91062OpenAlexW3107200001MaRDI QIDQ2021796

Hiromasa Ogawa

Publication date: 27 April 2021

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-020-00747-9

zbMATH Keywords

cheap talkmultiple sendersindependent informationsensitivity to opinions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Competitive cheap talk
• Strategic information transmission networks
• Interested experts and policy advice: Multiple referrals under open rule
• Cheap talk with two senders and complementary information
• A Model of Expertise
• Governing Adaptation¹
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Managing with Style: The Effect of Managers on Firm Policies
• Leadership, Coordination, and Corporate Culture
• Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk

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