Entry with two correlated signals: the case of industrial espionage and its positive competitive effects

DOI10.1007/S00182-020-00748-8zbMath1461.91175OpenAlexW3120146430MaRDI QIDQ2021798

Alex Barrachina, Yair Tauman, Amparo Urbano

Publication date: 27 April 2021

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-020-00748-8

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationlimit pricingentry deterrencepooling equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (3)

Price leadership, spying, and secret price changes: a Stackelberg game with imperfect commitment ⋮ Spying and imperfect commitment in first-price auctions: a case of tacit collusion ⋮ Spying in Bertrand markets under incomplete information: who benefits and is it stable?

Cites Work

• Limit pricing under third-degree price discrimination
• The value of information in a simple duopoly model
• Games with espionage
• Entry and espionage with noisy signals
• Extracting the information: espionage with double crossing
• Equilibrium Limit Pricing: The Effects of Private Information and Stochastic Demand
• Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model

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