Can players avoid the tragedy of the commons in a joint debt game?

DOI10.1007/S00182-020-00722-4zbMath1461.91192OpenAlexW3038016117MaRDI QIDQ2021807

Toru Takemoto, Hiromasa Takahashi, Akihiro Suzuki

Publication date: 27 April 2021

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-020-00722-4

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic gametragedy of the commonscommon resourceGreek overborrowingjoint debts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Dynamic games (91A25) Financial networks (including contagion, systemic risk, regulation) (91G45)

Cites Work

• Perfect equilibrium in non-randomized strategies in a class of symmetric dynamic games
• Generalized Instrumental Variables Estimation of Nonlinear Rational Expectations Models

This page was built for publication: Can players avoid the tragedy of the commons in a joint debt game?