A strategic justification of the Talmud rule based on lower and upper bounds

DOI10.1007/s00182-020-00727-zzbMath1461.91158OpenAlexW3121258842MaRDI QIDQ2021809

Min-Hung Tsay, Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, Chun-Hsien Yeh

Publication date: 27 April 2021

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.upo.es/serv/bib/wps/econ2002.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

upper boundsconsistencylower boundsNash programTalmud rulestrategic justification

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Games in extensive form (91A18) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (1)

Strategic justifications of the TAL family of rules for bankruptcy problems

Cites Work

• A non-cooperative interpretation of the \(f\)-just rules of bankruptcy problems
• Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud
• A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud
• A noncooperative view of consistent bankruptcy rules
• The Talmud rule and the securement of agents' awards.
• Relations among the central rules in bankruptcy problems: a strategic perspective
• Bargaining and bargaining sets.
• Strategic bargaining, surplus sharing problems and the nucleolus
• New characterizations of old bankruptcy rules
• Equivalence of axioms for bankruptcy problems
• Divide-and-permute
• Multilateral Bargaining
• How to Divide When There Isn't Enough
• Two-Person Cooperative Games

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