On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness: median-voting over intervals
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Publication:2021810
DOI10.1007/s00182-020-00728-yzbMath1460.91084OpenAlexW2783936897MaRDI QIDQ2021810
Panos Protopapas, Bettina Klaus
Publication date: 27 April 2021
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-020-00728-y
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