Reserve price signaling in first-price auctions with an uncertain number of bidders

DOI10.1007/s00182-020-00731-3zbMath1461.91140OpenAlexW3083695790MaRDI QIDQ2021812

Toshihiro Tsuchihashi

Publication date: 27 April 2021

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-020-00731-3

zbMATH Keywords

signaling gamesfirst-price auctionsreserve price signalinguncertain number of bidders

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (1)

Entry in first-price auctions with signaling

Cites Work

• Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders
• Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games
• Reserve price signaling
• Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
• Equilibrium bid functions for auctions with an uncertain number of bidders
• Auctions with uncertain numbers of bidders
• Auction and the informed seller problem
• Entry and Competition Effects in First-Price Auctions: Theory and Evidence from Procurement Auctions
• Comparing Auctions for Risk Averse Buyers: A Buyer's Point of View
• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
• Informational Equilibrium
• COMPARING PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS

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