Should I remember more than you? Best responses to factored strategies

DOI10.1007/s00182-020-00733-1zbMath1461.91057OpenAlexW3093648755MaRDI QIDQ2021813

Miroslav Zelený, Abraham Neyman, René Levínský

Publication date: 27 April 2021

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-020-00733-1

zbMATH Keywords

finite automatabounded rationalitybounded recall strategiesfactored strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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