Should I remember more than you? Best responses to factored strategies
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Publication:2021813
DOI10.1007/s00182-020-00733-1zbMath1461.91057OpenAlexW3093648755MaRDI QIDQ2021813
Miroslav Zelený, Abraham Neyman, René Levínský
Publication date: 27 April 2021
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-020-00733-1
Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
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