Common belief in future and restricted past rationality

DOI10.1007/s00182-020-00716-2zbMath1461.91053OpenAlexW3012492704MaRDI QIDQ2021823

Rubén Becerril-Borja, Andrés Perea

Publication date: 27 April 2021

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-020-00716-2

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic gamesepistemic game theoryproper rationalizabilitybelief in future rationalitybelief in restricted past rationality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic games (91A25) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites Work

• Subjective uncertainty over behavior strategies: A correction
• A relation between perfect equilibria in extensive form games and proper equilibria in normal form games
• Proper rationalizability in lexicographic beliefs
• Strong belief and forward induction reasoning.
• Proper rationalizability and backward induction
• Payoff information and self-confirming equilibrium
• Common belief and the theory of games with perfect information
• An epistemic approach to stochastic games
• Belief in the opponents' future rationality
• Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• The order independence of iterated dominance in extensive games
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria

This page was built for publication: Common belief in future and restricted past rationality