Common belief in future and restricted past rationality
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Publication:2021823
DOI10.1007/s00182-020-00716-2zbMath1461.91053OpenAlexW3012492704MaRDI QIDQ2021823
Rubén Becerril-Borja, Andrés Perea
Publication date: 27 April 2021
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-020-00716-2
dynamic gamesepistemic game theoryproper rationalizabilitybelief in future rationalitybelief in restricted past rationality
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