Aggregating experts' opinions to select the winner of a competition

DOI10.1007/s00182-020-00712-6zbMath1461.91122OpenAlexW2907976832MaRDI QIDQ2021827

Pablo Amorós

Publication date: 27 April 2021

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://theeconomics.uma.es/malagawpseries/Papers/METCwp2018-3.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

social choicemechanism designjuryaggregation of experts' opinions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Related Items (3)

Implementation in dominant strategies of quota rules to choose one candidate ⋮ Using sub-majoritarian rules to select the winner of a competition ⋮ Using supermajority rules to aggregate judgments of possibly biased experts

Cites Work

• Picking the winners
• A Bayesian model of voting in juries
• Symmetry and impartial lotteries
• Aggregation of expert opinions
• Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors
• On constant Maskin monotonic social choice functions
• The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
• Eliciting information from multiple experts
• A Model of Expertise
• Impartial Nominations for a Prize

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