Value dividends, the Harsanyi set and extensions, and the proportional Harsanyi solution

DOI10.1007/s00182-019-00701-4zbMath1461.91018OpenAlexW2911948448WikidataQ126389494 ScholiaQ126389494MaRDI QIDQ2021829

Manfred Besner

Publication date: 27 April 2021

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-019-00701-4

zbMATH Keywords

weighted Shapley valuesTU-game(generalized) Harsanyi set(proportional) Harsanyi solutionsharing function systemsvalue dividends

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (8)

Sharing the surplus and proportional values ⋮ Impacts of boycotts concerning the Shapley value and extensions ⋮ Nonadditive integration and some solutions of cooperative games ⋮ Disjointly productive players and the Shapley value ⋮ Compromising between the proportional and equal division values ⋮ Axiomatizations of the proportional division value ⋮ Values for level structures with polynomial-time algorithms, relevant coalition functions, and general considerations ⋮ The grand surplus value and repeated cooperative cross-games with coalitional collaboration

Cites Work

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• Constrained core solutions for totally positive games with ordered players
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• Potential, Value, and Consistency
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