Games of incomplete information and myopic equilibria
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Publication:2022795
DOI10.1007/s11856-021-2111-7zbMath1461.91060arXiv1801.02444OpenAlexW3135482772MaRDI QIDQ2022795
Stanisław Spież, Robert Samuel Simon, H. Torunczyk
Publication date: 29 April 2021
Published in: Israel Journal of Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1801.02444
Cites Work
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