Internal financing, managerial compensation and multiple tasks

DOI10.1007/S10436-020-00375-ZzbMath1461.91344OpenAlexW2800334029MaRDI QIDQ2022932

Fausto Panunzi, Sandro Brusco

Publication date: 3 May 2021

Published in: Annals of Finance (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10436-020-00375-z

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designcapital budgetingcorporate financemultitask agent

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Corporate finance (dividends, real options, etc.) (91G50) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

• Asymmetric Information, Incentives and Intrafirm Resource Allocation
• Optimal Auction Design
• Existence of Optimal Mechanisms in Principal-Agent Problems
• Internal versus External Capital Markets

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