Stable recycling networks under the extended producer responsibility
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2020.05.002zbMath1487.91087OpenAlexW3026868020MaRDI QIDQ2023986
Fang Tian, Greys Sošić, Laurens Debo
Publication date: 3 May 2021
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2020.05.002
OR in environment and climate changefarsighted stabilityextended producer responsibility (EPR)product heterogeneityrecycling coalition
Cooperative games (91A12) Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)
Related Items (1)
Cites Work
- Farsighted coalitional stability
- Coalition formation as a dynamic process.
- Competitive advantage of qualified WEEE recyclers through EPR legislation
- Multi-period reverse logistics network design
- Alliance or no alliance -- bargaining power in competing reverse supply chains
- Closed-Loop Supply Chain Models with Product Remanufacturing
- Formation of Alliances in Internet-Based Supply Exchanges
- Transshipment of Inventories Among Retailers: Myopic vs. Farsighted Stability
- Stable Farsighted Coalitions in Competitive Markets
- Competition and Cooperation in Decentralized Push and Pull Assembly Systems
- A Bargaining Framework in Supply Chains: The Assembly Problem
- Stability of information-sharing alliances in a three-level supply chain
- Dynamic Stable Supplier Coalitions and Invariance in Assembly Systems with Commodity Components
This page was built for publication: Stable recycling networks under the extended producer responsibility