Compromise is key in infinitely repeated bargaining with an evergreen clause

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2020.105170zbMath1461.91136OpenAlexW3107654051MaRDI QIDQ2025003

Prajit K. Dutta

Publication date: 11 May 2021

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105170

zbMATH Keywords

compromiserepeated bargainingevergreen clause

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

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• Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective
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• Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Bargaining and Reputation
• Bargaining in Standing Committees with an Endogenous Default: Figure 1
• Contract Negotiation and the Coase Conjecture: A Strategic Foundation for Renegotiation-Proof Contracts
• Two-Person Cooperative Games

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