A theory of dynamic contracting with financial constraints

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2021.105196zbMath1461.91171OpenAlexW3132304794MaRDI QIDQ2025005

Rohit Lamba, Ilia Krasikov

Publication date: 11 May 2021

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed017:1544

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationdynamic mechanism designfinancial constraints

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

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