Bayesian persuasion with costly messages

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2021.105212zbMath1461.91061OpenAlexW3131999083MaRDI QIDQ2025013

Yanyan Li

Publication date: 11 May 2021

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105212

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian persuasionpartial commitmentcostly messagesfull communicationinformation misrepresentation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items

Bayesian persuasion in sequential trials ⋮ On the benefits of being constrained when receiving signals ⋮ Noisy persuasion ⋮ Communication with endogenous deception costs ⋮ Optimal transparency of monitoring capability ⋮ Repeated communication with private lying costs ⋮ Bayesian persuasion with costly information acquisition ⋮ Trustworthy by design ⋮ Bayesian persuasion under partial commitment ⋮ Cheap talk with private signal structures

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