Lobbying and policy extremism in repeated elections

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2021.105223zbMath1461.91117OpenAlexW3130147168MaRDI QIDQ2025021

John Duggan, Peter Bils, Gleason Judd

Publication date: 11 May 2021

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105223

zbMATH Keywords

adverse selectionlobbyingmedian voteraccountabilityinterest grouprepeated elections

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10)

Cites Work

• Competitive lobbying for a legislator's vote
• The pluralistic view of politics: asymmetric lobbyists, ideological uncertainty and political entry
• On the benefits of party competition
• Competence and Ideology
• Policy Influence and Private Returns from Lobbying in the Energy Sector
• Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
• A Political Theory of Populism *

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