Full surplus extraction from samples

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2021.105230zbMath1465.91055OpenAlexW3134743784MaRDI QIDQ2025025

Robert D. Kleinberg, Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah, Jason D. Hartline

Publication date: 11 May 2021

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105230

zbMATH Keywords

auction designsamplesunknown distributions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Knightian uncertainty and moral hazard
• Reducing mechanism design to algorithm design via machine learning
• On the genericity of full surplus extraction in mechanism design
• Continuity in auction design
• Competitive auctions
• Surplus Extraction and Competition
• Genericity and Robustness of Full Surplus Extraction
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Mediated Partnerships
• The sample complexity of revenue maximization
• On the Generic (Im)Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design
• Algorithmic Game Theory

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