Cost-sharing mechanism for excludable goods with generalized non-rivalry

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2021.105233zbMath1461.91129OpenAlexW3134361560MaRDI QIDQ2025030

Emiko Fukuda, Tatsuhiro Shichijo

Publication date: 11 May 2021

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105233

zbMATH Keywords

network externalitieswelfare maximizationcrowdfundingequal cost-sharing mechanismmaximal welfare lossnon-rivalry

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Welfare economics (91B15) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

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• Augmented serial rules for an excludable public good
• Strategy-proof rules for an excludable public good
• Quantifying inefficiency in cost-sharing mechanisms
• Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods
• Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs: budget balance versus efficiency

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