Truthful aggregation of budget proposals
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Publication:2025032
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2021.105234zbMath1461.91148arXiv1905.00457OpenAlexW3136469110MaRDI QIDQ2025032
Rupert Freeman, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan, Dominik Peters, David M. Pennock
Publication date: 11 May 2021
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1905.00457
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Social choice (91B14) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
Related Items (3)
Mean versus median voting in multi-dimensional budget allocation problems. A laboratory experiment ⋮ A characterization of proportionally representative committees ⋮ Portioning using ordinal preferences: fairness and efficiency
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