Maxmin implementation

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2021.105250zbMath1461.91084OpenAlexW4250988803MaRDI QIDQ2025040

Rui Tang, Mu Zhang

Publication date: 11 May 2021

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105250

zbMATH Keywords

implementationambiguity aversioncyclical monotonicityrandomized reports

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

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