Common priors under endogenous uncertainty
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Publication:2025045
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2021.105254zbMath1461.91056OpenAlexW3152908808MaRDI QIDQ2025045
Elias Tsakas, Pierfrancesco Guarino
Publication date: 11 May 2021
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105254
Related Items (3)
On decay centrality ⋮ Charges and bets: a general characterisation of common priors ⋮ Optimism and pessimism in strategic interactions under ignorance
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