Extended proper equilibrium
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Publication:2025050
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2021.105258zbMath1461.91013OpenAlexW3153966313MaRDI QIDQ2025050
Paul R. Milgrom, Joshua J. Mollner
Publication date: 11 May 2021
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105258
equilibrium refinementproper equilibriumtremblesgeneralized second-price auctionextended proper equilibrium
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Equilibrium refinements (91A11)
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Cites Work
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