Efficiency, stability, and commitment in senior level job matching markets

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2021.105259zbMath1461.91169OpenAlexW2911574256MaRDI QIDQ2025051

Zaifu Yang, Ning Sun

Publication date: 11 May 2021

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105259

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitycoreprocedurecommitmentincentivejob matching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68) Labor markets (91B39)

Cites Work

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