A solution to the two-person implementation problem
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Publication:2025052
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2021.105261zbMath1461.91083OpenAlexW2953885452MaRDI QIDQ2025052
M. Remzi Sanver, Jean-François Laslier, Matías Núñez
Publication date: 11 May 2021
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://basepub.dauphine.psl.eu/handle/123456789/22304
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