Nash Q-learning agents in Hotelling's model: reestablishing equilibrium

DOI10.1016/j.cnsns.2021.105805zbMath1464.91062OpenAlexW3135817461MaRDI QIDQ2025538

Jiri Kukacka, Jan Vainer

Publication date: 14 May 2021

Published in: Communications in Nonlinear Science and Numerical Simulation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cnsns.2021.105805

zbMATH Keywords

reinforcement learningagent-based simulationHotelling's location modelNash Q-learning

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Stochastic models in economics (91B70) Spatial models in economics (91B72)

Related Items

Simulation of the Hotelling-Smithies game: Hotelling was not so wrong

Cites Work

• Learning in experimental \(2\times 2\) games
• Q-learning agents in a Cournot oligopoly model
• Minimal and maximal product differentiation in Hotelling's duopoly
• Learning from experience in the stock market
• Imitation and price competition in a differentiated market
• A noncooperative analysis of Hotelling's location game
• A heterogenous Cournot duopoly with delay dynamics: Hopf bifurcations and stability switching curves
• Experimental oligopolies modeling: a dynamic approach based on heterogeneous behaviors
• Reinforcement learning in population games
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• On Hotelling's "Stability in Competition"
• 10.1162/1532443041827880
• Equilibrium points in n -person games

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