One bit is all it takes: a devastating timing attack on BLISS's non-constant time sign flips

DOI10.1515/jmc-2020-0079zbMath1464.94052OpenAlexW3110821325MaRDI QIDQ2027275

Alexandre Wallet, Mehdi Tibouchi

Publication date: 25 May 2021

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Cryptology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/jmc-2020-0079

zbMATH Keywords

maximum likelihood estimationcryptanalysisinformation geometryside-channel analysisparametric inferencelattice-based cryptographyBLISS

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Geometric probability and stochastic geometry (60D05) Parametric inference under constraints (62F30) Cryptography (94A60)

Related Items (3)

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Uses Software

• BLISS
• strongSwan
• GALATICS

Cites Work

• LWE without modular reduction and improved side-channel attacks against BLISS
• Flush, Gauss, and reload -- a cache attack on the BLISS lattice-based signature scheme
• Lattice Signatures and Bimodal Gaussians
• Information Geometry
• Unnamed Item

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