Optimal government scrappage subsidies in the presence of strategic consumers

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2020.06.017zbMath1487.91070OpenAlexW3036118533WikidataQ115162802 ScholiaQ115162802MaRDI QIDQ2028765

Hosain Zaman, Georges Zaccour

Publication date: 3 June 2021

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2020.06.017

zbMATH Keywords

Stackelberg gamestrategic consumersgovernment subsidiesvehicle scrappage program

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42)

Related Items (2)

Credit offering strategy and dynamic pricing in the presence of consumer strategic behavior ⋮ Optimal trade-in and refurbishment strategies for durable goods

Cites Work

• Qualifying for a government's scrappage program to stimulate consumers' trade-in transactions? Analysis of an automobile supply chain involving a manufacturer and a retailer
• The effect of implementing trade-in strategy on duopoly competition
• Strategic price subsidies for new technologies
• Price subsidies and guaranteed buys of a new technology
• Subsidy scheme or price discount scheme? Mass adoption of electric vehicles under different market structures

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