The impact of product recall on advertising decisions and firm profit while envisioning crisis or being hazard myopic

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2020.06.021zbMath1487.90416OpenAlexW3039073724MaRDI QIDQ2028779

Arka Mukherjee, Satyaveer S. Chauhan

Publication date: 3 June 2021

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2020.06.021

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryproduct recallcrisis likelihood and impactequilibrium advertisinghazard myopia

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Optimal stochastic control (93E20) Marketing, advertising (90B60)

Related Items (3)

Price and quality competition while envisioning a quality-related product recall ⋮ Managing quality and pricing during a product recall: an analysis of pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis regimes ⋮ A survey of dynamic models of product quality

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Could myopic pricing be a strategic choice in marketing channels? A game theoretic analysis
• Differential game models of advertising competition
• Profiting from product-harm crises in competitive markets
• An optimal control problem with a random stopping time
• Dynamics of competing with quality- and advertising-based goodwill
• A stochastic control model of economic growth with environmental disaster prevention
• Quality Improvement Incentives and Product Recall Cost Sharing Contracts
• An Empirical Investigation of Advertising Strategies in a Dynamic Duopoly
• Deterministic and stochastic optimization of a dynamic advertising model

This page was built for publication: The impact of product recall on advertising decisions and firm profit while envisioning crisis or being hazard myopic