Identifying behaviorally robust strategies for normal form games under varying forms of uncertainty

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2020.06.022zbMath1487.91005OpenAlexW3036347224MaRDI QIDQ2028782

Brian J. Lunday, Richard P. Uber, William N. Caballero

Publication date: 3 June 2021

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2020.06.022

zbMATH Keywords

behavioral game theorybehavioural ORcognitive hierarchylevel \(k\) modelnonequilibrium structural models

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Experimental studies (91A90)

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Uses Software

• DeepStack

Cites Work

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