Limited-trust equilibria

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2020.07.009zbMath1487.91010OpenAlexW3041621130MaRDI QIDQ2028831

Rakesh Nagi, Jugal Garg, Timothy Murray

Publication date: 3 June 2021

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2020.07.009

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryreciprocitylimited-trustlong-term interactions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Experimental studies (91A90)

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